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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to explore some semantic prob-
lems related to the use of linguistic ontologies in information
systems, and to suggest some organizing principles aimed to
solve such problems. The taxonomic structure of current on-
tologies is unfortunately quite complicated and hard to under-
stand, especially for what concerns the upper levels. I will fo-
cus here on the problem of ISA overloading, which I believe
is the main responsible of these difficulties. To this purpose,
I will carefully analyze the ontological nature of the catego-
ries used in current upper-level structures, considering the ne-
cessity of splitting them according to more subtle distinc-
tions or the opportunity of excluding them because of their
limited organizational role.
Introduction
Currently, a number of efforts in the area of language en-
gineering are aimed to the development of systems of ba-
sic semantic categories (often called "upper-level ontolo-
gies"), to be used as main organizational backbones, suit-
able to impose a structure on large lexical repositories.
Examples of such systems are the Penman Upper Model
(Bateman et al., 1990), recently evolved into the Pangloss
ontology (Knight & Luk, 1994) and the Revised Upper
Model (Bateman, 1995), the Mikrokosmos ontology
(Mahesh, 1996), and the Wordnet (Miller, 1995) upper
structure.
Besides strictly linguistic applications, large lexical re-
sources are getting a high potential relevance for informa-
tion systems, as they are being used not only for NL in-
terfaces, but also for requirements analysis and specifica-
tion (Burg, 1997), database design (Ambrosio, Métais &
Meunier, 1997; Van de Riet, Burg & Dehne, 1998), con-
ceptual models validation and enhancement (Burg & Van
de Riet, 1997; van der Vos, Gulla & van de Riet, 1997),
conceptual schema integration (Mirbel, 1997), informa-
tion retrieval and extraction (Guarino, 1997).
These applications impose however strict constraints on
the semantics of the hierarchical structures appearing in
current upper level ontologies, since in this case a node
does not denote a lexical entry, but rather a class of enti-
ties of the domain. In other words, while apparently simi-
lar in many cases, lexical relations may be different from
semantic relations.
The purpose of this paper is to explore some semantic
problems related to the use of linguistic ontologies in in-
formation systems, and to suggest some organizing prin-
ciples aimed to solve such problems. See (Guarino, 1998)
for a general overview of the role of ontologies in infor-
mation systems, and for the proposal of ontology-driven
information systems. See also (Uschold & Gruninger,
1996; Fridman Noy & Hafner, 1997) for an overview of
current work in ontology design (not only confined to lin-
guistic ontologies).
Unfortunately, the taxonomic structure of current ontolo-
gies is often quite complicated and hard to understand, es-
pecially for what concerns the upper levels. This seems to
be in contrast with the widespread belief that the upper
level of these ontologies should be: i) largely independent
of particular applications; ii) possibly language-indepen-
dent, at least within a common culture; and iii) easily un-
derstandable by everybody, in order to be extensively reus-
able.
This paper intends to show how the theoretical tools of
so-called Formal Ontology (Guarino, 1995; Smith, 1998)
can help to formulate a number of ontological distinctions
and design principles able to produce cleaner, more gen-
eral, more rigorous and at the same time more understand-
able top-level ontologies.
I will focus here on a single problem, which is the main
responsible, in my opinion, of the difficulties of current
upper levels: ISA overloading. To this purpose, I will
carefully analyze the ontological nature of the categories
used in current upper-level structures, considering the ne-
cessity of splitting them according to more subtle distinc-
tions or the opportunity of excluding them from an upper-
level taxonomy because of their limited organizational
role.
After a discussion of some examples, I will briefly present
the basic theoretical tools of Formal Ontology, which ad-
dress the classical ontological issues of philosophical
logic: the theory of parts (mereology), the theory of
wholes (topology, in a very general sense), the theory of
identity, and the theory of dependence. I will discuss then
a few organizing principles based on these tools, which
can be of help in improving the semantic coherence and
the reusability of upper level lexical resources.
The Main Problem: ISA Overloading
All ontologies are centered on a taxonomy, based on a par-
tial ordering relation named in various ways, like ISA,
subsumption, hyperonymy/hyponymy. Such a taxonomy
is the main backbone of the ontology, which can be
“fleshed” with the addition of attributes and other relations
among nodes (like meronymy or antonymy). As rather
usual, we shall generically call ISA the main taxonomic
relation (not to be confused with InstanceOf, which links
a node to the class it belongs to and is not a partial order).
The problem with ISA when considering linguistic on-
tologies like WordNet is that it is intended as a lexical re-
lation between words, which not always reflects an onto-
logical relation between classes of entities of the world.
Although this fact is well known, the tendency to confuse
the two aspects is quite high, especially when linguistic
ontologies are used for non-linguistic applications.
For instance, a common praxis in linguistic ontologies is
to rely on multiple inheritance to represent polysemy.
This results in an overloading of the role of ISA links,
which, as we shall see, may cause serious semantic prob-
lems.
To eliminate these problems, the solution I propose in
this paper is to pay more attention to the ontological im-
plications of taxonomic choices, limiting ISA links to
connect nodes sharing similar identity criteria. In this
way, the taxonomy reflects a basic ontological structure
with a clear semantics, while the extra-information cur-
rently encoded by ISA links can be represented by means
of specialized links and attributes.
I report below some examples of what I consider as ISA
overloading:
Confusion of senses:
• A window is both an artifact and a place
(Mikrokosmos)
 Reduction of sense:
• A physical object is an amount of matter
(Pangloss)1
• An association is a group (WordNet)
• A person is both a physical object and a living
thing (Pangloss)
• A communicative event is a physical, a mental,
and a social event (Mikrokosmos, Penman)
 Overgeneralization:
• A place is a physical object (Mikrokosmos,
WordNet)
• An amount of matter is a physical object
(WordNet)
 Suspect type-to-role link:
• A person is both a living thing and a causal agent
(WordNet)
• An apple is both fruit and food (WordNet)
 Confusion of taxonomic roles:
• Taxonomy of qualities in Pangloss and Penman
• Separable Entity in Pangloss
 
 The five classes of examples above represent different
kinds of ontological misconceptions, which are discussed
in turn.
 Confusion of senses.
 The example reported shows a case where different senses
of a word are collapsed into a single class, inheriting from
multiple superclasses. In Wordnet, two different “synsets”
are associated to the term window: one is subsumed by
opening, while the other by panel. While the choice of us-
ing multiple inheritance to handle polysemy may appear
as economical at a first sight, it presents obvious onto-
logical inconveniences: is there an entity that is both a
panel and an opening? A cleaner solution is to represent
the two senses as disjoint concepts, expressing the intrin-
sic links existing between them by means of extra rela-
tions. For instance, an opening needs to exist in order for
a window to function properly.
                                                
1
 It is interesting to compare this with WordNet, where an
amount of matter is a physical object.
 Reduction of sense.
 In this case, the ISA link points to an aspect of the mean-
ing of a given concept that does not fully account for its
identity: a physical object is more than just an amount of
matter, an association is more than a group of people, as
well as a person is more than a physical object. In the lat-
ter case, the fact that persons are very special physical ob-
jects is represented in Pangloss by the extra link to living
thing, but here the problem is analogous to the previous
case, with the difference that there is now a clear order in
the two senses represented by means of multiple inheri-
tance: the body sense is more basic than the living being
sense, since the living being depends and is constituted by
its body. In the last example (Fig. 4), three different
senses are collapsed together, as if a communicative event
was just a physical event with some extra properties.
 Overgeneralization.
 In this case, a single category includes other categories
very different in nature, weakening therefore its meaning.
For instance, WordNet’s gloss for physical object is:
 
 “a physical (tangible and visible) entity; ‘it was full of
rackets, balls and other objects’”
 
 This seems to contradict the examples reported: i) a place
is not tangible; ii) amount of matter  is an uncountable
category, while the statement reported in the gloss refers
to a countable notion of physical object. Therefore, these
choices force a weaker interpretation of physical object.
 Suspect type-to-role link.
 There is something disturbing in the examples reported: a
person is necessarily a living thing, while her/he plays the
role of causal agent only when involved in certain events.
Analogously for the apple, which is necessarily a fruit
while it can be a food.  As we shall see, person and apple
are types, while causal agent and food are roles. On the
basis of ontological analysis, I shall bring a reason why
forbidding these links.
 Confusion of organizational roles.
 Another source of troubles (less serious however than the
previous ones, since it only affects the overall organiza-
tion) is the tendency to express all the unary properties of
a certain class of entities in terms of superclasses to in-
herit from. Take for instance the hierarchy of qualities in
the Penman Upper Level (inherited by Pangloss): all the
various formal properties of qualities (like staticity, polar-
ity, etc.) correspond to nodes of the ontology, which of
course gets quite tangled. The problem is that there is no
distinction between the nodes carrying a major organiza-
tional role in the taxonomy, and those that simply express
a particular property. Another example is the node decom-
posable object in Penman and Pangloss, which subsumes
a number of different classes generating a high degree of
tangleness. My suggestion is to avoid including these
nodes in the taxonomy, relying on attributes to express
these properties. In other words, not all unary properties
need to be expressed by means of ISA links.
 Most of the examples above refer to cases of polysemy
represented by means of ISA links. In the following, I
will briefly introduce some theoretical tools which can be
adopted to better understand the systematic ontological
structure underlying polysemy, with a goal similar to that
of (Pustejovsky, 1995; Pustejovsky, 1998).
 The Methodology: Formal Ontology
 In the current practice, the engineering process of ontol-
ogy building lacks well-established principles and meth-
odologies. Some methodological proposals have been
made in recent times (Bateman et al., 1990; Gruber, 1995;
Mahesh, 1996; Uschold & Gruninger, 1996), but most of
the ontologies currently in use seem to be the result of a
mixture of ad-hoc creativity and naive introspection. Re-
cently, however, a different line of research began to
emerge, characterized by a highly interdisciplinary perspec-
tive. The philosophical field inspiring this trend is that of
formal ontology, which has been defined as “the system-
atic, formal, axiomatic development of the logic of all
forms and modes of being” (Cocchiarella, 1991).
 In practice, formal ontology can be seen as the theory of
distinctions within:
• the entities of the world to be included in our domain
of discourse, or particulars
• the properties and relations used to talk about such
entities, or universals 2
 The study of formal ontological distinctions can be organ-
ized around a number of core theories (or, better, theoreti-
cal tools), which have always been at the basis of philo-
sophical research. I shall briefly report here the relevant
questions addressed by these theories; see (Smith, 1998)
for a further introductory account.
 Theory of parts.
 The theory of parts is at the basis of any form of onto-
logical analysis. Relevant questions that must be addressed
are:
• What counts as a part of a given entity?
• What are the properties of the parthood relation?
• Are there different kinds of part?
 An important example of a theory of parts is given by ex-
tensional mereology. Much work must be addressed how-
ever in order to come up to a satisfactory theory of inten-
sional mereology, where integrity and identity are taken
into account. See (Simons, 1987) for a thorough reference
to the problems of mereology.
 Theory of wholes.
 A given entity (like a collection of disconnected pieces)
can have parts without being considered as a single whole.
The theory of wholes (or theory of integrity) studies the
ways of connecting together different parts to form a
whole. Relevant questions that must be addressed are:
• What counts as a whole? What does make it a whole?
• In which sense are the parts of a whole connected?
What are the properties of such a connection relation?
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 Just for simplicity, we assume that universals are not in-
cluded in the domain of discourse.
• How is the whole isolated from the background?
What are its boundaries?
• What role do the parts play with respect to the whole?
 Notice that in order to understand the various forms of
part-whole relation (Winston, Chaffin & Herrmann, 1987;
Artale et al., 1996) the general theory of parts must be
supplemented with a theory of wholes. Together, the two
theories form what may be called mereotopology (Varzi,
1996; Varzi, 1998).
 Theory of identity.
 The theory of identity builds up on the theory of parthood
and the theory of wholes, studying the conditions under
which two entities exhibiting different properties can be
considered as the same. Relevant questions that must be
addressed are:
• How can an entity change while keeping its identity?
• Do entities have any essential properties?
• Under what conditions does an entity loose its iden-
tity?
• Does a change of parts affect identity?
• Does a change of topological or morphological prop-
erties affect identity?
• Does a change of “point of view” change the identity
conditions?
 The last question is especially relevant for our discussion.
For instance, consider the classical example of a vase of
clay. Should we consider the vase and the clay it is made
of as two separate individuals, or just as two different
points of view about the same individual? The answer
may be difficult, but a careful analysis tells us that the
two views imply different identity criteria: when the vase
looses its identity by crashing to the floor, the clay is still
there. This is because the clay has an extensional criterion
of identity, since it always coincides with the sum of its
parts, while the vase requires a particular arrangement of
its parts in order to be a vase. Therefore, we are in pres-
ence of two different individuals. See (Hirsch, 1982) for an
account of the identity problems of ordinary objects, and
(Noonan, 1993) for a collection of philosophical papers in
this area.
 Theory of dependence.
 The theory of dependence studies the various forms of ex-
istential dependence involving specific individuals that be-
long to different classes. We refer here to the notion of ex-
istence as “actual existence”, not as “logical existence”. In
this sense, existence can be represented by a specific predi-
cate (like in (Hirst, 1991)) rather than by a logical quanti-
fier. Relevant questions that must be addressed are:
• Does the actual existence of an individual necessarily
imply the actual existence of another specific individ-
ual? (Rigid dependence)
• Does the actual existence of an individual necessarily
imply the actual existence of some individual belong-
ing to a specific class? (Generic dependence)
• Does the fact that an individual belongs to a particular
class necessarily imply the existence of a different in-
dividual belonging to another class? (Class depend-
ence)
 An example of rigid dependence may be the relationship
between a person and his/her brain, while the relationship
between a person and his/her heart is an example of ge-
neric dependence (because the heart can be substituted with
another heart, and the identity of the person does not
change). Finally, an example of class dependence is the
relationship existing between the class “Father” and the
class “Child”.
 The Role of Identity Criteria
 After this quick overview of the main tools of formal on-
tology, let us focus on the notion of identity criterion,
which plays a fundamental role in our discussion. Briefly,
we can say that an identity criterion (IC) for a property P
is a binary relation IP such that (Noonan, 1993)
 Px ∧ Py ∧ IPxy → x=y
 If, for a given property P, we are able to define such an IP,
then we say that P carries an IC for its instances.
 We see therefore that an IC determines a sufficient condi-
tion for identity. In practice, ICs for classes corresponding
to natural language words are difficult or impossible to
express. Rather, it is relatively easy (and quite useful) to
identify some necessary conditions for identity, which al-
low one to:
• individuate  an entity as an instance of a class C
• re-identify an instance of C across time (persistence)
• count the instances of C
It is important to take in mind that the decision of ascrib-
ing an IC to a certain class is the result of our conceptu-
alization of the world, i.e. of our ontology. While we can
assume that for the very basic things of our world, like
particles of matter, the ICs are basically the same for
every human being, being grounded on notions of spatial
and temporal continuity somehow “hardwired” in our sen-
sorial apparatus, the presence of emergent properties like a
particular structure or a particular shape may result in a
change of ICs depending on a specific bias or point of
view.
After these clarifications, let us see how ICs may affect a
taxonomic organization. Consider to this purpose the
beautiful example reported in (Lowe, 1989): should or-
dered-set be subsumed by set? Obviously not, exactly be-
cause the two classes have different ICs (two different or-
dered-sets may correspond to the same ordinary set). For
the same reason, association or queue of people should not
be subsumed by group, and person should not be sub-
sumed by physical object (as a physical object, a body has
persistence conditions different from a living being). Yet,
all these ISA links exist in WordNet.
In conclusion, Lowe proposes the following principle,
which we assume as the basic principle to be adopted for
well-founded ontologies:
“No individual can instantiate both of two sorts if
they have different criteria of identity associated
with them”.
 (Lowe, 1989)
Notice that Lowe refers here to the technical notion of
sort, which is not the same as an arbitrary class or unary
property: according to (Strawson, 1959), a sort “supplies a
principle for distinguishing and counting individual par-
ticulars which it collects”, i.e., it carries an IC. The no-
tion of sort will be discussed in greater detail below.
A Minimal Ontology of Particulars
In order to address the problems discussed in the introduc-
tion, we need to make some minimal assumptions about
the basic ontological distinctions among particulars and
universals, in the light of the methodological suggestions
presented above. I quickly present below what I consider
the “basic backbone” of the ontology of particulars and
universals, with the only purpose of making clear the dis-
cussion on the design principles, which is the goal of this
paper.
Particular
Location
Space (a spatial region)
Time (a temporal region)
Object
Concrete object
Continuant (an apple)
Occurrent (the fall of an apple)
Abstract object (Pythagoras’ theorem)
Figure 1: The basic backbone of the ontology of
particulars.
A minimal ontology of particulars is presented in Fig. 1.
The first distinction is between objects and locations.
Without assuming locations as primitive entities distinct
from objects, the notion of object becomes too general for
our purpose, and the distinctions within objects become
difficult to explain (see the previous remarks on overgen-
eralization).
A location is either a region of (absolute) space or an in-
terval of (absolute) time. Objects are assumed to be con-
crete or abstract according to their possibility of having a
location in time and/or in space.
Within concrete objects, I assume here for granted the
classical distinction between continuants and occurrents.
They correspond to what are usually called objects and
events, but we have already used the term “object” in a
more general sense, and this terminology (suggested in
(Simons, 1987)) is less ambiguous.
Continuants have a location in space, but this location
can vary with time. They have spatial parts, but they do
not have a temporal location, nor temporal parts. They
always have other continuants as parts.
Occurrents are “generated” by continuants, according to the
ways they behave in time. In order for an occurrent to ex-
ist, a specific continuant must take part to it. If the con-
tinuant changes its identity, the occurrent also changes its
identity, so that continuants are rigidly dependent on con-
tinuants. Examples of occurrents are the change of loca-
tion of a body, but also the permanence of a body in a
given location for a given time (a state occurrence). Occur-
rents always have other occurrents as parts (continuants
take parts to occurrents, but are not part of them). They
have a unique temporal location, while their exact spatial
location is less obvious, and it is however bound to the
location of the participating continuants. For a thorough
review of the ontology of occurrents, see (Casati & Varzi,
1996).
Abstract objects do not have a location in space or in
time. They are included here just for completeness, as we
shall not mention them. Notice however that I refer here
to abstract particulars, such as Pythagoras’ theorem or
(maybe?) the number “1”. Most of entities often classified
as abstract objects are however universals (see below).
Ontological Levels
Let us see now how the application of Lowe’s principle
makes it possible to introduce systematic distinctions
among ontological categories that seem to explain – at
least prima facie – some of the phenomena of systematic
polysemy discussed in (Pustejovsky, 1995; Buitelaar,
1998), and implicit in the examples of ISA overloading
considered before.
Take for instance an animal, which can be conceptualized
as an intentional agent, as a biological organism or just as
a piece of matter. I argue that, since these concepts imply
different ICs, they correspond to disjoint categories: three
distinct individuals, instances of the three concepts above,
share a common spatial location. Since the animal de-
pends on the underlying biological organism, as well as
the biological organism depends on the underlying amount
of matter, there is an intrinsic order within these catego-
ries, which belong therefore to different ontological levels.
A dependence relation links higher levels to lower levels:
an animal depends on its body, which depends on body
parts having a certain functionality, which depend on
pieces of matter having specific properties, and so on. No-
tice that this dependence is of a generic kind: a vase de-
pends on some amount of clay, but not necessarily always
the same specific clay (it can loose parts, it can be repaired
with a different piece of clay).
Atomic (a minimal grain of matter)
Static (a configuration)
Mereological (an amount of matter)
Physical
Topological (a piece of matter)
Morphological (a cubic block)
Functional (an artifact)
Biological (a human body)
Intentional (a person or a robot)
Social (a company)
Figure 2: Ontological levels correspond to disjoint sets of
particulars, according to the different ICs adopted to con-
ceptualize them. Examples are reported in parenthesis.
We shall introduce therefore a classification of ontological
levels based on different kinds of IC (Fig. 2), correspond-
ing to different sets of individuation and persistence condi-
tions (Fig. 3).
The idea of levels (or strata) of reality is loosely inspired
to Husserl’s work (Poli, 1996). The notion adopted here,
however, is more explicitly related to the theory of iden-
tity, and makes use of some notions of mereotopology.
The presentation below has to be intended as rather pre-
liminary and deliberately non-technical, and it expands and
refines some ideas introduced in (Guarino, 1997).
Each of the levels of Fig. 2 corresponds to a class of ICs,
as explained in Fig. 3. These classes are assumed to de-
scribe disjoint sets of entities, in accordance with Lowe’s
principle. They are orthogonal to the distinctions among
particulars introduced in the previous section. In our ex-
amples, we refer however mostly to continuants.   
Atomic
Individuation: minimal size
Persistence: spatio-temporal continuity
Static
Individuation: mereological sum of atoms
Persistence: same properties
Mereological
Individuation: mereological sum of entities
Persistence: same parts
Topological
Individuation: self-connection
Persistence: similar topology
Morphological
Individuation: proximity
Persistence: similar shape
Functional
Individuation: purpose
Persistence: persistence of functionality
Biological
Individuation: presence of life
Persistence: persistence of life
Intentional
Individuation: intentional behavior
Persistence: persistence of intentional behavior
Social
Individuation: inter-agent connections
Persistence: persistence of inter-agent connections
Figure 3: different conditions (only necessary for identity)
associated to ontological levels.
At the atomic level, we consider entities having minimal
spatial or temporal dimensions, according to a certain
granularity dependent on our conceptualization. As men-
tioned before, we assume spatio-temporal continuity as a
necessary condition for the identity of these entities.
At the static level, all the non-temporal properties of a
particular contribute to its identity: if one of these
changes, identity is lost. In this level only very peculiar
objects are defined, namely configurations of atoms in the
case of continuants and situations (i.e., occurrences of
configurations) in the case of occurrents. Such objects
may play a crucial role in a formal axiomatization (see for
instance (Borgo, Guarino & Masolo, 1997), since they
avoid the introduction of modal framework.
At the mereological level, the IC is extensional: two enti-
ties are the same if and only if they have the same parts
(mereological essentialism). Regions of space, temporal
intervals and amounts of matter belong to this level. The
entities belonging to the subsequent levels have an inten-
sional criterion of identity, in the sense that mereological
identity is neither sufficient nor necessary for identity.
The physical level corresponds to ICs bound to spatial
configuration of matter (i.e., to topo-morphological prop-
erties). It can be split into two separate layers.
At the topological layer, the IC is bound to topological
properties: for instance, topological self-connection can be
considered as a necessary property to maintain identity: a
piece of matter belongs to this layer, while a (possibly
disconnected) amount of matter belongs to the mereologi-
cal level. The two things are distinct entities, since a piece
of matter can cease to exist (generating new pieces) while
the same amount of matter is still there. A doughnut be-
longs to the same level, but with a more sophisticated IC,
since its identity changes when the hole is destroyed while
the dough remains self-connected.
At the morphological layer, the IC is bound to morpho-
logical properties (or, in general, gestaltic properties re-
lated to spatial proximity), like spatial shapes or temporal
patterns. A change of these properties can influence iden-
tity. A cube-shaped block is an example of an instance of
this level: if its shape changes (above a certain limit) it is
not the same cube any more, while still being the same
piece of matter. Another example is a constellation,
whose IC does not require topological self-connection.
The levels above the physical level are related to ICs
bound to the way objects interact with the external world.
At the functional level, the IC is bound to functional and
pragmatic properties: identity is destroyed when function-
ality is destroyed. At the biological level, the IC is bound
to properties related to life: identity is destroyed when bio-
logical activity ceases. At the intentional level, the IC is
bound to capability of intentional behavior: identity is de-
stroyed when such capability ceases. At the social level,
the IC is bound to social rules and conventions involving
the interaction of intentional objects. Identity is destroyed
when some of these rules change.
In conclusion, we can see how the introduction of onto-
logical levels leads to simpler and (I believe) more under-
standable taxonomies, as shown by Fig. 4. The costs of
this choice are: i) a moderate proliferation (by a constant
factor corresponding to the number of levels) of the num-
ber of entities in the domain; ii) the necessity to take into
account different relations besides ISA, such as co-
localization and dependence.
social-event
mental-event
physical-event
communication-event
perceptual-event
social-event
mental-event
physical-event
communication-event
perceptual-event
Figure 4: Above: communication and perceptual
events in Mikrokosmos. Below: the simplification re-
sulting from the assumption of ontological levels.
Dashed arrows denote the dependence relation.
A Minimal Ontology of Universals
Besides distinctions among particulars, formal ontology
addresses also distinctions among universals, briefly intro-
duced previously as “the properties and relations used to
talk about the entities of our domain of discourse”. Before
discussing their ontology, we must however clarify that
properties and relations are not to be intended here in the
usual extensional way (i.e., respectively, as subsets of the
domain or sets of tuples), but rather in their intensional
meaning, as conceptual primitives used to model a certain
domain. See on this point (Guarino & Giaretta, 1995;
Guarino, 1998), where the standard strategy of considering
intensional relations as functions from possible world into
sets is adopted.
Universal
Property
Type (person) (+I +R)
Category (location, object) (-I +R)
Role (~R +D)
Material role (student) (+I)
Formal role (patient, part) (-I)
Attribution (red, decomposable) (-I -R -D)
Relation (part-of)
Figure 5: The basic backbone of the ontology of
universals. I = identity, R = rigidity, D = dependence.
A minimal ontology of universals, based on a revision of
(Guarino, Carrara & Giaretta, 1994), is reported in Fig. 5.
The first distinction is the usual one between properties
and relations, according to the number of arguments. We
only focus on primitive properties, which are not obtain-
able by Boolean combination of other properties.
The purpose of studying the distinctions among properties
is twofold. On one hand, we are interested in assessing
their organizational role in a taxonomy, that is their prac-
tical relevance as taxons, i.e. nodes of a taxonomy; on the
other hand, we want to study their attitude to generate
clean and understandable hierarchies, with a minimum de-
gree of “tangleness”. With the help of formal ontology,
we can characterize such distinctions on the basis of the
following meta-properties:
1. Identity (+I). The property of carrying an IC.
2. Rigidity (+R). A property P is rigid if, when P(x) is
true in one possible world, then it is also true in all
possible worlds. Person and location are rigid, while
student and tall are not.
3. Anti-rigidity (~R)3. A property P is anti-rigid if, for
each x, P(x) is true in one possible world, and false in
a different possible world. Student and tall are both
nonrigid (-R) and anti-rigid (~R).
4. Dependence (+D). A property P is dependent if, nec-
essarily, whenever P(x) holds, then Q(y) holds, with
x ≠ y and P ≠ Q (see the class dependence mentioned
before). Father is dependent, person is not.
A type is a property that is rigid and carries an IC. Types
play the most important organizational role in a taxon-
omy. Assuming that each type has a distinct set of ICs,
we have that, according to Lowe’s principle, a taxonomy
of types is always a tree. When a type specializes another
type, it adds further ICs to those carried by the subsuming
type. For instance, when the type triangle specializes
polygon, it adds the ICs based on the equivalence of two
                                                
3
 See (Guarino, 1992; Guarino, Carrara & Giaretta, 1994) for a
technical account of ontological rigidity and for a characteri-
zation of roles as non-rigid entities. The notion of anti-
rigidity, introduced here for the first time, seems however to
better account for the ontological nature of roles, and ex-
plains the issue discussed in Fig. 6.
sides and one angle (or two angles and one side) to those
proper of polygons (same sides and same angles).
A category is a property that is also rigid but does not
carry a specific IC. Since they cannot be subsumed by
types (otherwise they would have an IC), categories only
appear in the uppermost levels of a taxonomy. Their role
is to make clear the most general distinctions.
Types and categories are both rigid, and can be either de-
pendent or independent (person is independent, event is de-
pendent). A role is a property that is anti-rigid and is al-
ways dependent4. Material roles like student do have an
IC, while formal roles like part do not. However, the IC
of material roles is only indirect, since they do not intro-
duce any specific IC, but rather they inherit it from a sub-
suming type. No explicit mutual disjointness assumption
is made for roles, as they tend to generate tangled hierar-
chies. They have for this reason a limited organizational
relevance. It seems therefore advisable to explicitly distin-
guish roles from types in order to easily isolate the main
backbone of a taxonomy, and to perform inferences related
to mutual disjointness (Fig. 6). Notice that, as shown by
Fig. 6, a role cannot subsume a type, since the former is
anti-rigid and the latter is rigid.
Finally, an attribution5 is a property that is not rigid, is
not dependent, and does not carry any IC. Attributions do
not seem to play any useful organizational role in the on-
tology of particulars, as they may hold for disparate kinds
of entity. Hence, they should not appear as taxons there,
while the related information can be contained within the
definitions of taxons whose instances exhibit such attribu-
tion. We see therefore how with this choice we solve the
problems of confusion of organizational roles mentioned
at the beginning of this paper.
entity
* causal-agent
person
life-form
African European * worker
?
Figure 6. Types and roles in WordNet (roles marked
with *). While it is OK for a type to subsume a role,
the vice versa is forbidden according to the semantics
we have given. Notice that, being types, African and
European are assumed as disjoint.
                                                
4
 This account of roles in terms of rigidity seems to work
well, but it requires some philosophical care with concepts
like child: in order for child to be anti-rigid, there must exist
for each person a world where such a person is not a child.
This world can be imagined as the one where this person i s
the first person on the Earth.
5
 This term is introduced in order to avoid confusion with the
term attribute, largely used in knowledge representation and
modelling languages. Color, part, father  may be attributes,
while red is an attribution (in this case, an attribute-value).
Conclusions:
Some Basic Design Principles
In conclusion, let us summarize the ontology design prin-
ciples emerging from this discussion, which can solve the
ISA overloading problems we have mentioned in prece-
dence.
1. Be clear about the domain. Any formal theory is a the-
ory about a domain. Such a domain must be clarified in
advance. In particular, in our case, it is very important to
make clear whether the entities we speak of (i.e., the in-
stances of our classes) are:
• particulars, i.e. either
(a) individuals of the actual world;
(b) individuals of any possible world (including
  the actual one);
• universals, i.e. conceptual properties and relations;
• linguistic entities like nouns, verbs or adjectives.
What I have suggested is to have two separate ontologies
for particulars (under option (b)) and universals, keeping
lexical items out of the domain.
2. Take identity seriously. We have seen how the notion
of identity criterion (and especially Lowe’s principle) can
play a crucial role in clarifying ontological distinctions.
3. Isolate a basic taxonomic structure. We have seen how
the notion of “basic backbone” acquires a rigorous mean-
ing, being constituted by categories and types. Under the
assumption of having each one a different set of ICs,
types form a tree of mutually disjoint classes. We can rea-
sonably assume, as a design principle, that also categories
form a (very shallow) tree of mutually disjoint classes.
4. Identify roles explicitly. We have seen that an explicit
tag for roles has two advantages: i) you can easily hide
them in order to isolate the basic backbone; ii) you can
perform inferences involving mutual disjointness while
avoiding explicit declarations, unless for cases like son-
daughter, where two roles are linked by an antonym link.
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